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Abstract 
As it is known, Turkey experienced a severe economic crisis in the year 2001. This 
economic crisis has been costly for the Turkish economy and has typically been 
accompanied by a collapse of output and employment as well as striking declines in real 
wages. Not only economic insufficiencies and bottlenecks but also political uncertainty 
had sizeable impacts in the formation of economic crisis. The 2001 Crisis interestingly 
caused a set of catastrophe and it is worthy to analyze its emergence, mal-administration, 
and wide damage on the Turkish economy and to show the structure that transformed 
political climate in the post-crisis period. The interaction of political and economic 
dimensions of 2001 crisis also accompanies strong implications for 2008 recession and 
this paper finally discusses lessons of 2001 crisis for 2008 recession through the lenses of 
interplay between politics and economics. 
Keywords: Turkish 2001 Crisis, Political Instability, Economical Insecurity 
 
Introduction 
Economic policy is one of the favorite topics of the “introduction parts”. The intervention 
of political power to economy or the effects of economic structure on policy, with other 
words the telescopic structure of politics and economy is a well known point. From the 
past to present, with the formation of the interactions founded by different ideologies 
between the mode of production and governments have made it necessary to include the 
external factors as well as the internal ones in today’s flattened world. Today it’s not a 
surprise to see that a deep crisis that emerges somewhere geographically so far from a 
country can drive the country into both economic and political crises by the integrated 
financial markets. In this context, the economic crises are also called global crises 
because, a crisis that has emerged in any economy as an effect of the globalization can 
expand rapidly to others by the interconnected fiscal markets. 
Both the relationships between political stability - economic growth and political 
instability - economic uncertainty have certain results. Political instability causes some 
effects on economy such as increases in inflation and unemployment rates, decline in 
growth rates, declines in the maturities of internal and foreign debts, increase in the cost 
of debts, slowdown in investments, rises on capital flight and the flight of human capital, 
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rise in the problems with servicing of loans and problems like preferring seignorage 
instead of tax income. There is also a very close relation between political instability and 
macro economic uncertainty in Turkey. Turkey has faced a deep banking and foreign 
exchange rate problems in November 2000 and February 2001 crises and in that process 
political stresses loomed large.(Kibritçioğlu 2002)  Confronting of economic crises with 
political instabilities and ambiguities can be accepted as the leading factor causing the 
chronicity of the problem. 
Table 1. Anatomy of Economic Crises in Turkey 
 Before 1980 After 1980 
Causes and 
Characteristics of 
Crises 
Balance of payment 
crises caused by 
structural problems 
Financial crises caused by external 
shocks (currency crises, liquidity 
crises) 
Reflections of 
crises to real 
economy 
Restricted Wide scale and diffuse 
Economy Policy Import substitution Industrialisation Export Oriented Industrialisation 
Stabilisation 
measures against 
crises 
Contractionary budget 
and fiscal policy 
applications 
Contractionary monetary policy 
applications 
Capital Flow Restricted and have no main role to create crises 
Unrestricted and one of the main factor 
of crises 
Banking Sector 
Under public control and 
have no effect to create 
crises 
A Liberal and relatively less controlled 
system and in the position of one of the 
main actors of crises 
Public Sector 
Borrowing 
Requirement 
In the framework of 
development plans and 
at a sustainable level 
Unsustainable level  
Foreign Trade 
Deficit 
Creating with structural 
reasons Creating with external impacts 
Financing of 
Government 
Budget 
Taxes and long term 
foreign credits 
Short term foreign credits and 
intensive domestic loan 
Source: Adopted from Ercan UYGUR, “Krizden Krize Türkiye: 2000 Kasım ve 2001 Şubat 
Krizleri”.  
The reasons of recent crises that repeat very often and form rapidly can be explained with 
the fact that these crises emerge in the banking systems or financial markets. The effects 
of the crises can be more severe especially in developing countries. As the developing 
countries do not have effective operating, deep and healthy financial markets, the markets 
in these countries become more vulnerable to speculations. When the uncontrolled funds 
suddenly enter to the developing markets, these markets react positively more than they 
should. However, the sudden exit of these funds produces a shock effect on the markets 
and in turn an economic crisis. After the crisis, the confidence to the governments in these 
countries declines. Crisis abolishes the stability in the country and causes a deep distrust. 
While this environment of distrust causes speculative movements to turn into shocks, the 
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shocks turn into crises. Thus a developing country begins to experience the shock/ crisis 
spirals together. 
Turkey has met the financial crises after applying export oriented economy strategy in 
order integrate to the globalization process. Therefore it is better to examine the crises in 
Turkey anatomically in two phases - before and after 1980. 
Before 1980’s, the crises emerged in Turkey can rather be explained with the structural 
features of Turkish economy. However the crises emerged of post 1980 period 
particularly that of 1990s, are characterized as external crises. As an example, two 
important economic crises that Turkey has experienced in November 2000 and in 
February 2001 can be given. The crisis in February 2001 is the sequel and the second 
wave of the November 2000 crisis. 
1. Political And Economic Improvements Towards 2001 Crisis  
1.1.  Turkish 1999 Elections and 57th Government 
Parliamentary and local elections were held together at 18 April 1999 in Turkey. This 
election were affected by problem of terror in Turkey’s southeast region so, as nationalist 
left Democratic Left Party (DSP) became the first party and Nationalist Action Party 
(MHP) as nationalist right, became the second at this election results. Turan emphasizes 
that Prime Minister Ecevit gained great reputation because Öcalan had been captured 
before 1999 elections.(Turan 2004) However, studies show that electoral behaviours 
influence not only conjuncture but also economical conditions. Especially the first party 
which gained elections was different for three elections during 1990s. Economic 
circumstances were more important than ideological opinion for Turkish electorate. The 
table below indicates Turkish 1999 MP’s Election results. 
 
Table 2 . Turkish 1999 Election Results 
 
Party Ballot Percentage MP 
DSP 6.919.670 22,19 136 
MHP 5.606.583 17,98 129 
FP 4.805.381 15,41 111 
ANAP 4.122.929 13,22 86 
DYP 3.745.417 12,01 85 
CHP 2.716.094 8,71 - 
HADEP 1.482.196 4,75 - 
BBP 456.353 1,46 - 
Independents 270.265 0,87 3 
Others 1.059.608 3,4 - 
Source: Adapted from http://www.tbmm.gov.tr 
Moderate right Motherland Party (ANAP) became the forth at 1999 elections and the 
third partner of 57th government. Republican People’s Party (CHP) couldn’t gain right of 
representation at the parliament for the first time of its all history. Furthermore, the first 
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party’s voting rate was less than 25 percent. This fragmented political landscape was one 
of the initial causes of political instability.(Eren and Bildirici 2001) To the election results 
at the parliament five political parties gained right of representation. On the other hand 
1999 elections made formation of a coalition necessary. Thus 57th Turkish Government 
(later called Milliyetçi Anasol) was formed by DSP, MHP and ANAP at 28 May 1999. In 
the government program, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit explained the reason of the 
coalition of these three parties as such:  
“With this tendency, our society has shown that they have a desire for tolerance, 
compromise and cooperation rather than instability, conflict and polarization.”   
57th Government gathered former opponent political groups. Government’s aim was a 
competitive market economy in the economic sphere. In other words a stabile economy 
would be made up. However, at this three party coalition government, administration of 
economy was shared among these three parties.  
At government, having over thirty ministries, Ministry of Finance, Labor and Social 
Security were given to ANAP, Ministry of Industry and Trade was given to MHP. In 
addition to this, Turkish Treasury, Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BDDK), 
Central Bank, Ziraat Bank, Capital Markets Board (SPK), Halk Bank, Development 
Bank, Emlak Bank were given to DSP, Undersecretary of Foreign Trade, EXIMBANK, 
Turkish Accreditation Agency were given to MHP, administration of customs, 
Privatization Administration, the duty of coordination in the public collective agreements 
were given to ANAP. That’s why, administration of economy was fragmented. 
In the progressing period that the three parties, having different perspectives, couldn’t 
maintain in cohesion created instability at markets. Also this situation caused great delay 
infrastructure reforms. IMF postponed the third credit tranche putting up the argument 
that infrastructural reforms were delayed. National Security Council (MGK) held at the 
date of 21 February 2001 the tension between President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and Prime 
Minister Bülent Ecevit triggered February 2001 economical crisis.(www.belgenet.com) 
 
2. Economic And Political Faktors Of Novemvber 2000 And February 2001 Crises 
In Turkey 
 
· Increases in Public Borrowing 
There were sharp increases both foreign and domestic loans in Turkey so dynamic of the 
debt became unsustainable. Total public debt was 170 million dollars at the end of the 
2001 and its 60 million dollars was foreign debt, 110 million dollars was domestic 
debt.(Özbilen 2001)  
· Central Bank’s Situation 
The exchange rate basket is anchored to 1 dollar + 0.77 Euro in the disinflation 
programme of 2000. The Central Bank of Turkey declared that Turkish Lira would 
depreciate against the basket by 2.1% in the first quarter and 1.7%, 1.3% and 1% in the 
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second, third and forth quarters respectively. It was planned an exchange rate 
appreciation rate of 0.9% in the beginning of 2001 and to abandon the anchor programme 
and continue with floating exchange rate in July 2001 but the realizations do not allow the 
application of these predictions.(Ongun 2002) 
November 2000 crisis is caused by public bank’s and institutional investor’s excessive 
demand for foreign currency. There was a 6.1 billion dollars reduction at Turkish Central 
Bank foreign currency reserve between November 17 and December 5. Turkish Central 
Bank’s gross foreign currency reserves reduced 18.3 billion dollars and total net foreign 
currency reserves reduced 13 billion dollars. In consequently applicated IMF programme 
became insecurity with November 2000 crisis. Banks financial structures get worse 
because of high interest rates and all of this reasons composed February 2001 crisis. 
Consequently in the framework of IMF’s stabilization program’s targets didn’t catch. 
The confidence loss of the applied programme due to the November Crisis, and 
worsening of fiscal structure of the banks due to high interest rates constitute the basic 
reasons of the February Crisis.(Alp 2001) 
· Problems of Banking Sector 
Private trade banks had an important role to creating November 2000 crisis. The most 
important reason of November 2000 crisis was private banks foreign currency demand. 
They tried to close their open positions with foreign currency. On the other hand the main 
actor of February 2001 crisis was public banks. Re-construction of public banks was 
delayed and their financial situation gets worse. At the same time public banks demand 
foreign currency and to cause a new crisis.  
· Increases in Foreign Trade Deficit 
One of the main reasons of November 2000 and February 2001 crises was vast foreign 
currency demand. Foreign currency demand is caused by foreign trade deficit. Fixed 
currency policy created enormous foreign trade deficit so foreign currency demand 
increased. Turkey’s foreign trade indicators of years 2000, 2001 and 2002 are given in 
Table 3.  
 
Table 3. Foreign Trade (Annual, Million USD) 
 2000  2001 2002 
Export 27.775 31.334 35.761 
Import 54.503 41.399 51.203 
Foreign Trade Volume 82.278 72.733 86.964 
Foreign Trade Deficit -26.728 -10.065 -15.442 
Export/Import 51.0 75.7 69.8 
Export/GNP 13.9 21.5 19.9 
Import/GNP 27.3 28.4 28.5 
Source: http://www.dtm.gov.tr/dtmadmin/upload/EAD/IstatistikDb/eko01.xls, 08.03.2008. 
There was a major increase in imports of Turkey in 2000. This development effected 
foreign trade deficit negatively. The interest rates fall down because of the implicated 
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stabilization program. So delayed consumption desires actualized. Besides, over-valued 
TL caused relatively cheap foreign goods.   
Turkey’s export increased to 27.8 billion dollars in 2000 from its 1999 level of 26.6 
billion dollars. The rate of export increase was 4.5%. But export increase is relatively less 
than import increase. Limited increase in exports based on over-valued TL. Because of 
over-valued TL, Turkey’s export good became expensive and they lost competitive 
advantage.  
· Capital Movements 
A sudden capital outflow may lead to liquidity problems and hence cause output loses in 
emerging market economies such as Turkey and brings about an equal amount of 
reduction in the foreign exchange reserves (Alper and Sağlam 2001).  
The increase in the trade deficit in Turkey made especially the foreign investors worry 
about the sustainability of the programme that caused a high level of capital outflow from 
Turkey. This increased the foreign exchange demand rapidly and triggered crisis. 
Despite the increase in interest rates capital flied out of the country. The capital flight had 
negative effects on foreign exchange reserves and the reserves decreased. As the result of 
these all, the pressure on foreign exchange increased (Ergi 2001). 
In 2000, the long-term capital movements increased by 114.3% and short-term capital 
movements increased by 431.6% (www.foreigntrade.gov.tr). 
The economy enjoyed a net capital inflow of $12.5 billion during the first 10 months of 
2000 on account of a large inflow by non-residents which financed not only the mounting 
current account deficits, but also net outflows by residents and increases in reserves 
(Akyüz and Boratav 2003). The reasons of the foreign capital inflows are the plausibility 
of the support to the stand-by treaties signed with the IMF, the confidence on nominal 
exchange rate and more crucially the continuation of positive arbitrage income for hot 
money despite the decrease in interest rates. 
However the confidence on the stability programme has started to diminish since the 
second half of the year 2000 in Turkey. First alerts of capital movements revealed with 
negative net capital flows in September 2000. The capital outflow was interpreted as a 
signal of economy wide crisis. 
Briefly, a financially shallow emerging market economy such as Turkey could not endure 
the disruptive consequences of such financial shocks. Yet, the 2000 disinflation program 
completely ignored the fragile conditions of the Turkish financial and asset markets, and 
denied both the monetary (the Central Bank) and the fiscal (the Treasury) authorities’ 
utilization of their traditional tools of austerity, rendering them powerless  against the 
speculative forces of the markets, all in the name of good governance (Cizre and Yeldan 
2005). 
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· Political Instability and Haziness   
Economy reacting according to the political atmosphere showed a fragile structure. The 
factors like 1999 Earthquake, 2000 and 2001 economical crises, United States’ Iraq 
operation, the illness of Prime Minister Ecevit, disruption of DSP which was the greatest 
party in the coalition government and the parliament, the chaos of other parties caused 
complication in Turkish economy. 
In Turkish case irregular economy and corrupted political structure are the main sources 
of crises. Thus black hole in economy, continual debt public deficit, in great scale, 
corruptions, unproductiveness, lack of synchronization between agriculture and industry 
increase the size of crises (Yakın 2001). 
· Negative Atmosphere Created by 1999 Earthquake 
The earthquake occurred in Marmara on August 17th 1999 had many direct and indirect 
adverse effects on the industry and the economy.  
 
1. The Crisis Process 
 
The first crisis of the inflation targeting was experienced on November 22th 2000. The 
reason of it was a speculative attack. The attack increased the interbank overnight 
interests up to 873%. The basic reason of liquidity shortage is the additional demand of 
banks trying to close their year-end short positions. The foreign exchange demand has 
risen because of the increased liquidity demand of banks towards foreign exchange 
(Tunca and Karabulut 2001). 
With the increase in foreign trade deficit, foreign investors lost their confidence to the 
applicability of foreign exchange regime. A shock in the economy appeared when foreign 
investors sold securities net worth of which is $5.2 billion and repatriate it. With $2.9 
billion additional help of the IMF between December 2000 and January 2001 temporary 
stabilization of capital movements was acquired. Until February 2001 a total of $6.3 
billion of capital outflow was experienced. The total capital outflow as the result of 
November 2000 and February 2001 crises were $11.5 billion. $10.3 billion of this 
outflow was foreign capital outflow. This shows the size of negative shock that Turkey 
encountered because of capital flows. These figures explicitly show the effect of capital 
movements on the formation of financial crises. During capital movements a deflection of 
approximately 12% of GNP occurred. 
The November 2000 crisis was overcome by additional liquidity injection of the Central 
Bank, high inflation rates, high level of foreign exchange sales and the additional reserve 
of $7.5 billion of the IMF’s commitment (Yeşilada, Noordijk, Nelson 2004). However the 
problems in the economy persist and the Treasury continued borrowing with high interest 
rates. These loaded extra difficulties on the programme.(Tunca and Karabulut 2001) After 
the November 2000 crisis, the fragility of the economy and the risks of fiscal sector have 
increased (Ergi 2001). 
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The reconstruction process of public banks was sluggish. In the process public banks kept 
collecting deposits with high costs, borrowing from money market and financing through 
short term repo (Erdoğan 2001).  
 
3.1. February 2001 Crisis 
 
After the speculative attack in November 2000, Turkey experienced a political crisis on 
February 19th 2001 and following the crisis a second speculative attack (Tunca and 
Karabulut 2001). The Central Bank persisted in its net domestic asset target and caused 
the deepening of crisis (Şamiloğlu 2002). As a result of second speculative attack in 
February 2001 the interbank interest rates risen to 6200%. The Central Bank intervene the 
market with $5.36 billion but couldn’t stop the speculative attack (Tunca and Karabulut 
2001). The Central Bank decided to leave exchange rate to floating on February 22nd as 
the demand to foreign exchange has climbed to a record level that cannot be supplied 
(Uygur 2001). 
In February 2001 crisis the financial markets were locked, the payment system collapsed, 
and foreign exchange demand continued to rise. The interest rates increased rapidly 
(Şamiloğlu 2002). The increase in foreign exchange has caused the contraction of 
domestic demand. Besides the government suffered loss of prestige with two crises one 
after another (Şamiloğlu 2002). Turkey has signed 16 programmes with the IMF and 
most of them were left aside. In the February 2001 crisis another IMF programme ended 
in failure (Alp 2001). Therefore the “Disinflation Programme” supported by the IMF was 
abandoned. Instead the “Transition to Strong Economy Programme” applying floating 
exchange rate is used (Akyüz and Boratav 2003). 
 
2. Economic And Political Atmosphere After 2001 Crisis  
 
4.1. Economic Situation after 2001 Crisis: Growth and Foreign Trade 
 
Turkey experienced a serious contraction as a consequence of the financial crisis occurred 
in 2001. The new macroeconomic policies and structural reforms introduced in the 
aftermath of the crisis, which have been redesigned as a 3-year-forward economic 
programme in the beginning of 2002, have caused a significant improvement in the 
economy. 
2001 crisis created serious impact on real sector. With sharply increasing interest rates, 
source transfer has ceased to real sector and economic uncertainty has obstructed 
investments. Furthermore a reduction in domestic demand occurred, many enterprises 
borrowed with foreign exchange faced with the risk of bankruptcy (Seyidoğlu 2003). 
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After rapid economic contraction in 2001, Turkey economics entered growth process 
again. Economic stability and affirmative expectations achieved by monetary and fiscal 
policy implemented after crisis and structural accommodation contributed to beginning of 
growth process in all sectors, especially industry sector (www.tcmb.gov.tr). 
In Turkey, a fluctuating growth process has been realized in the last ten years. In this 
process, the main developments that affected the economic performance have been the 
high real interest rates, the public sector imbalances, inflation volatility, macroeconomic 
instability, crises in Asia and Russia, the earthquake in 1999 and the financial crisis in 
2001(ekutup.dpt.gov.tr).  
Graphic 1. Movements of GDP (Annual, Million USD) 
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Source: Adapted from the data available in Turkish Statistical Institute.   
As illustrated in Graphic 1, GDP has a sudden decrease during 1994 crisis. Again the 
decrease in GDP in 1999 that can be accepted as the reflection of financial crises in Asia 
and Russia is striking. After 2000 and 2001 crises, a sharp decrease in GDP is observed. 
After the crisis in 2001 a decrease of 9.5% in national income was experienced and the 
economy faced with a significant contraction. The new macroeconomic policies and 
structural reforms introduced in the aftermath of the crisis have caused a significant 
improvement in the economy. Nonetheless national income has achieved level before 
crisis in 2003. Continuous economic growth which started in the first quarter of 2002 has 
carried on second quarter of 2006 and so growth process is observed in economy during 
18 periods. During 2002-2006 period, while economy grew by 7.2 percent on the average, 
employment increased by 0.7 percent on the average annually. One of the main factors 
behind this development can be counted as low growth rate of imports due to the slowing 
down of total domestic demand especially in the second half of 2006 and continuation of 
exports increase owing partly to the increase in real exchange rate (DPT, 2008). 
 195 
 
 
Graphic 2. Movements of Export and Import (Annual, Thousand USD) 
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Source: Adapted from the data available in Turkish Statistical Institute.   
As a result of the depreciation of Turkish Lira after the floating exchange rate regime and 
the decrease in domestic demand because of the crisis, the enterprises tend to make 
export. Compared to previous year; Export in 2002 was realized with an increase of 
14.1% and was $35.8 billion. On the other hand   import in 2002 was $51.2 billion 
compared with in 2001(ekutup.dpt.gov.tr). The increases of export in 2001 and 2002 have 
continued in 2003 with a higher pace. Therefore in 2003 export has increased by 31% and 
reached to the level of $47.3 billion. This level made Turkey the largest 24th exporter in 
the world. Besides, the increase rate of 31% made Turkey the second country in terms of 
export growth among top 30 export countries. The reasons of the increase in exports may 
be listed as the continuation of the increase in production despite the low domestic 
demand, the continuation of the decreases in the costs of real workforce and the of 
productivity, finance easiness as a result of interest rate decreases, positive reflections of 
dollar/euro parity developments, and cost advantage resulted from low increase rates in 
the prices of energy. 
In 2005 it is observed that the export of Turkey has increased to $73.5 billion with a 
growth rate of 16.3% and the imports have increased to $116.8 billion with a growth rate 
of 19.7% (www.foreigntrade.gov.tr).  
After 2002 Turkey has faced with an economic crisis although the gap between imports 
and exports increases. The reason of this can be attributed to positive effect of political 
stability and partly to the “certainty” environment.  
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Table 4. Key Indicators of Macroeconomic Performance: A Comparison of Pre-
Crisis and Post-Crisis Period 
 Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
Growth  Slow and 
fragile  
High and more likely to be sustainable; unusually 
rapid growth of 8.6% in 2001 and 9% in 2004 
(and also 6.1% in 2006)  
Inflation  Chronicall
y high  
Low; reduced to single digit levels  
Budgetary Deficit  Unusually 
large  
Considerably reduced; large primary surplus; in line 
with the IMF targets of 6.5%; close to Maastricht 
requirements  
Banking Sector 
Performance  
Poor  Significantly improved  
Debt- GNP  Unusually 
large  
Large, but significantly reduced  
Dependence on 
Short- Term 
Capitals  
High  Still high; but risks of crisis considerably reduced 
due to an improved macroeconomic environment 
and tighter regulation of the banking system  
Current Account 
Deficit  
Large  Large in spite of a significant increase in exports  
Inflows of Foreign 
Direct Investment  
Limited  Significant increase with a certain time-lag  
Privatization  Limited  Significant increase again with a certain time-lag  
Productivity 
Improvement as a 
Source of Growth  
Weak  Strong  
Source: Adapted from ÖNİŞ, Ziya, "Beyond the 2001 Financial Crisis: The Political Economy of 
the New Phase of the Neo-liberal Restructuring in Turkey". International Studies Association, 
Annual Convention. San Diego, California, USA (March 2006). 
<http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p98591_index.html>, 24.02.2008. 
 
4.2. Political Atmosphere after 2001 Crisis  
 
There is no doubt that economical crisis in the late 2000 and 2001 changed political 
panorama in Turkey. With the economical crisis, the conflicts among the three partners of 
57th government increased. The leading cause of these conflicts was Kemal Derviş6 who 
was called urgently from abroad in 2 March 2001 and became minister of state 
responsible for economical administration. It was announced that Derviş’s responsibility 
                                               
6 Kemal Derviş was graduated from London School of Economics. He attended a Ph.D program at 
The Princeton University at USA. Derviş became economy and international relations adviser of 
Bülent Ecevit till 1973 to 1976. He was attended to World Bank in 1978. See also 
http://www.biyografi.net/kisiayrinti.asp?kisiid=1352, 19.11.2006. 
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included Turkish Treasury, Central Bank, Ziraat Bank, Capital Markets Board (SPK), 
Halk Bank, Development Bank, Emlak Bank, Banking Regulation and Supervision 
Agency (BDDK). 
These improvement decreases the prestige of the 57th government significantly. Derviş 
acted as the fourth partner of the government. The ministers having difference of opinion 
were made to resign. For instance Transport Minister Enis Öksüz, member of MHP, and 
Minister of State Yüksel Yalova, member of ANAP. Besides Justice and Development 
Party coming to power at the 2002 elections founded in August 2001. 
Derviş announced early election while Prime Minister was lining in hospital. These 
resulted in political instability and a rise economical fragility. 
Derviş, Hüsamettin Özkan who was deputy prime minister and DSP’s sorehead and 
İsmail Cem who was Foreign Affairs Minister decided to act together. Hence The Party 
of New Turkey was formed. However, Derviş left this decision later.  
Before 2002 elections three new parties emerged as the candidate for power: Justice and 
Development Party, Young Party and New Turkey Party.  
Table 5. Turkish 2002 and 2007 Election Results 
 2002 Elections MP’s 2002 2007 Elections MP’s 2007 
AKP 34.3 365 46,5 341 
CHP 19.4 178 20,8 112 
DYP 9.54 - 5,4 - 
MHP 8.38 - 14,2 71 
GP 7.25 - 3 - 
DEHAP 6.22 - - - 
ANAP 5.13 - - - 
Independents  0,9 8 5,2 26 
Others 8,88 - 4,7 - 
Source: Adapted from Mehmet Turgut,18 Nisan 1999 ve 3 Kasım 2002 Genel Seçimleri 
Değerlendirmesi, Boğaziçi Yayınları,2.basım,İstanbul 2003,s.174. 
The early election was held on 3 November 2002 in Turkey. The partners of 57th 
government couldn’t coped with economical and political crises that’s why, they couldn’t 
reach threshold. Becoming the first party in 1999 DSP’s voting rate decreased around 1 
percent at 2002 elections. Also ANAP regressed to 5 percent and MHP moved backward 
its own traditional voting rate 8 percent.  
 
3. The Lessons Of 2001 Crisis And Implications For 2008 Recession Expectation 
 
The 2001 Crisis interestingly caused a set of catastrophe and it is worthy to analyze its 
emergence, mal-administration, and wide damage on the Turkish economy and to show 
the structure that transformed political climate in the post-crisis period. The interaction of 
political and economic dimensions of 2001 crisis also accompanies strong implications 
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for 2008 recession and it is discussed the lessons of 2001 crisis for 2008 recession 
through the lenses of the interplay between politics and economics in this paper. 
Taking into account recent economic evidence, it is important question that “how can be 
affected Turkish economy by the recession expectations in all over the world, especially 
in the U.S. economy in 2008?” There are some possible scenarios for current economic 
situation caused by recession expectation.   
Firstly, if there is a recession in the U.S. economy, Turkish economy will be seriously 
affected. If the reforms do not implement and indiscipline of fiscal policy exists, there 
will be new economic crisis in Turkish Economy. Especially in real economy, there will 
be a reduction with export decline. Application of futile policies will cause economic 
recession, increase inflation and unemployment.  
On the contrary, secondly, if the reforms implement and disciplines of monetary and 
fiscal policy provide, the recession will create serious impact on Turkish economy. 
However, slowdown effect caused by this situation on economic growth and employment 
will not reason a new economic crisis. 
After the 2001 crisis, political policies which focused on economy are main factors of 
economic stability. For this reason, government’s increased voting rate in Turkey 2007 
elections dedicate to political policies which based on economics. Briefly, economy-
focused political policies provide protection from external shocks. Otherwise, 
applications of populist policy have occurred an economic crisis such as 2001 crisis in 
Turkey, regardless of whether external shock or not. 
6.  Conclusion 
Uncontrolled short term capital flows increased especially in 1990s with globalisation has 
encountered the developing countries like Turkey with high risks. In order to attract 
capital floes developing countries have applied high interest and exchange rates. These in 
turn increased economic instability (Stiglitz 2003). The financial crises both the 
developed and developing countries have experienced revealed that the applications of 
fixed exchange rate are open to speculative attacks (Bordo and Flandreau 2001). 
One of the basic reasons of the crisis in Turkey is some weak parts of the stability 
program applied. Especially “the lack of political will” looms large. In fact these 
deficiencies caused the failure of the programme targets and the formation of crisis. 
Although the IMF is not the sole responsible of these crises intensified in the era of 
globalisation with the policies it applied and made countries to apply the Fund seems like 
one of the actors who contributes the formation of crises in the era of financial 
globalisation (Öniş 2003). One of the critiques towards the Fund is that it applies the 
same prescription to all countries and it neglects country-specific conditions (Stiglitz 
2002). 
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The expectation and desire of “economic stability” were very effective in the formation of 
one-party-government and a two-party-parliament after 2002. Also the improvements in 
economic indicators after 2002 emphasises the accuracy of this expectation. 
In the process of stable growth of economy after the crisis it is significant that the policy 
makers and implementers have necessary will and endeavour to furnish a stable structure 
as well as the economic policies. 
It appears that economic stability together with political stability comes with the 
governance and the administration of the economy in one political party in the 2002 
election. The economy replied the increasing confidence in the market and decreasing 
uncertainty in a positive manner and entered to a permanent growth tendency. This 
constitutes a clean example of reciprocal interaction between economic and political 
orientation. 
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